Heathrow Airport Power Outage Results in Estimated £100 Million Loss for Airlines
Unprecedented closure and compensation disputes emerge following March 21 power failure.
A power outage at Heathrow Airport on March 21 caused significant disruptions, affecting approximately 300,000 passengers and leading to estimated financial losses for airlines ranging from £60 million to £100 million.
The outage, attributed to a fire at a nearby electricity substation, led to the closure of the airport to all flights until about 6 PM on the day of the incident.
Around 1,000 flights were impacted, with diverted or cancelled services, though affected passengers are not entitled to compensation under current regulations.
Nigel Wicking, the Chief Executive of the Heathrow Airline Operators' Committee, expressed astonishment that Heathrow's terms of use absolved the airport from liability for the disruption.
Wicking highlighted that there had been prior warnings regarding the power supply issues, including discussions he had with the Team Heathrow director on March 15, and further concerns communicated to senior airport officials on March 19. These discussions arose following several incidents, including thefts of wiring that had previously caused runway lighting failures.
In testimonies before the Transport Select Committee, Wicking stated, "There were a couple of incidents that made me concerned," emphasizing the need for better resilience in the airport's power infrastructure.
Heathrow's Chief Executive, Thomas Woldbye, was also scrutinized for his decision-making during the outage, particularly for choosing to go to bed shortly after the fire started.
Woldbye defended the airport's closure, stating that keeping the airport operational would have posed a significant safety risk to passengers due to the failure of civil infrastructure, including traffic lights, which impacted the surrounding community of 65,000 homes.
Woldbye characterized the substation fire as a critical failure, noting that it was the largest power supply source for the airport with a capacity of 70 megawatts.
He indicated that while Terminal 5 was showing operational lights, it was not safe to reopen without complete functionality of fire surveillance systems and other safety measures.
The CEO acknowledged that reinstating full power and operation could take considerable time and emphasized the airport's reliance on contracts with energy providers, which he indicated may not be sufficient to ensure resilience.
He estimated that enhancing the airport's power resilience infrastructure could require investments of up to £1 billion.
Wicking responded to Woldbye's remarks by asserting the airlines should not bear additional costs for resilience improvements, arguing that the airport should have already guaranteed adequate power supply measures.
This incident has raised questions about the responsibility and accountability of major airports in managing critical infrastructure failures and the potential need for regulatory review.
The outage, attributed to a fire at a nearby electricity substation, led to the closure of the airport to all flights until about 6 PM on the day of the incident.
Around 1,000 flights were impacted, with diverted or cancelled services, though affected passengers are not entitled to compensation under current regulations.
Nigel Wicking, the Chief Executive of the Heathrow Airline Operators' Committee, expressed astonishment that Heathrow's terms of use absolved the airport from liability for the disruption.
Wicking highlighted that there had been prior warnings regarding the power supply issues, including discussions he had with the Team Heathrow director on March 15, and further concerns communicated to senior airport officials on March 19. These discussions arose following several incidents, including thefts of wiring that had previously caused runway lighting failures.
In testimonies before the Transport Select Committee, Wicking stated, "There were a couple of incidents that made me concerned," emphasizing the need for better resilience in the airport's power infrastructure.
Heathrow's Chief Executive, Thomas Woldbye, was also scrutinized for his decision-making during the outage, particularly for choosing to go to bed shortly after the fire started.
Woldbye defended the airport's closure, stating that keeping the airport operational would have posed a significant safety risk to passengers due to the failure of civil infrastructure, including traffic lights, which impacted the surrounding community of 65,000 homes.
Woldbye characterized the substation fire as a critical failure, noting that it was the largest power supply source for the airport with a capacity of 70 megawatts.
He indicated that while Terminal 5 was showing operational lights, it was not safe to reopen without complete functionality of fire surveillance systems and other safety measures.
The CEO acknowledged that reinstating full power and operation could take considerable time and emphasized the airport's reliance on contracts with energy providers, which he indicated may not be sufficient to ensure resilience.
He estimated that enhancing the airport's power resilience infrastructure could require investments of up to £1 billion.
Wicking responded to Woldbye's remarks by asserting the airlines should not bear additional costs for resilience improvements, arguing that the airport should have already guaranteed adequate power supply measures.
This incident has raised questions about the responsibility and accountability of major airports in managing critical infrastructure failures and the potential need for regulatory review.
